Monday, July 28, 2014

Policy Brief: Higher Education Spending



Introduction  
            Over the past several decades, the popularity of college education has been increasing significantly.  According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, approximately 65.9% of high school graduates enroll in college.1 Of these enrollees, about 60% attend 4-year institutions seeking degrees most commonly in business, social science and history, health professions, and education.2 Finally, the overall graduation rate for 4-year degree-granting institutions was 59%.  By working through these numbers, we find that just over 23% of high school graduates go on to complete 4-year college degrees.    
            Given the fact that nearly a quarter of high school graduates complete 4-year college degrees, it is important to consider the value of post-secondary education.  There are two economic models at play here.  The first is the human capital model which reasons that those who continue their education receive skills through education that are valued in the labor market.  The second is the signaling model, which conversely reasons that those who attend higher education institutions are simply signaling their pre-existing abilities by attaining a degree.  By analyzing the implications of these two perspectives, we can arrive at useful conclusions about the value of education. 
Background
            One of the most appealing aspects of obtaining a 4-year college degree is the wage premium that arises due to this additional education.  The National Center for Education Statistics finds that the median earnings for the average adult holding a bachelor's degree is about 50% higher than the respective adult with only a high school diploma.3 Interestingly, those who go to college but do not obtain a degree typically earn only 6.8% more than high school graduates. 
            Many education studies assume that the relationship between education and earnings is linear.  This makes sense under the human capital model because increases in education should lead to increases in human capital.  However, the data suggest that this may not be the case.4  In fact, those who drop out just prior to graduation, completing up to 96% of their degree, still hover around a 10% wage premium.  This empirical evidence is highly suggestive of a so-called "sheepskin effect" that supports the assumptions of the signaling model.  The sheepskin effect is the impact of earning a degree on wage premiums.  The fact that someone can finish only a slightly higher degree of education and yet is expected to earn a nearly 40% wage premium over the person that dropped out just prior to graduating implies that it is the degree that carries the most value, not the human capital increases through education. 
Proposal
            This analysis forces us to consider several structural issues surrounding education.  One of the most important issues to consider is who pays for higher education.  The federal government spent 146 billion dollars in academic year 2010-2011 in the form of grants and loans to students.5 However, we must ask ourselves if it is appropriate for the federal government to subsidize education when the data suggest that education does little to increase productivity through human capital increases and truly acts as more of a signal of already existing abilities.
            My proposal is that government subsidization of higher education spending should be significantly reduced or phased out.  The reasoning here is that government subsidy is causing an inefficient allocation of resources to education.  Since education evidently does not provide useful increases in the human capital stock but rather only signals the students most innately suited for the workforce, it is not necessary for government to correct for the "market failure" of a less than socially optimal level of education.  Congress should eliminate loans for anyone other than perhaps the truly low income students who have little chance at being able to attend college without some form of assistance.  Even in the case of low income individuals, I would recommend that grant programs be converted into loan programs as to not distort the value of education.                          
Analysis
            Furthermore, government subsidy in the education market causes several additional moral and economic issues.  Since 1965, the federal government has increased real spending on funding for higher education continuously.  This increasing subsidy has several adverse effects in the market for education.  Americans have been increasing their demand for education continuously as well, especially given the fact that it is becoming a larger social norm for women to become educated.  This increase in demand pushes prices higher.  Normally, these increases in prices would be restrained by consumer surplus, but the federal government, acting as a third party, has cushioned the cost of tuition thus diminishing the budget restraint of prospective students.6
            Although the federal government has hugely inflated the sticker price of college, federal aid has probably allowed more students to attend college granted that enrollment increased about 48% between 1986 and 2006.7 However, this likely caused additional distortions outside of simply rising prices.  More students required remedial work and were less likely to be able to handle the increased academic rigor of college - causing them to drop out.  This has likely placed downward pressure on the quality of academic institutions as they seek to increase retention rates by lowering the standards and rigor of their courses.  This is further evidenced by the fact that literacy among college graduates decreased at similar rates that enrollment grew between 1990 and 2000.8 
            The moral issue surrounding government subsidization of college students is that it is wrong to take money from taxpayers in order to fund college students looking to bolster their future income.  It is particularly unfair when you consider that many taxpayers did not go to college themselves and are indeed paying for someone else to become wealthier.  This extracts money from efficient users and transfers it to less efficient students who have not earned the aid.  Moreover, by ensuring that aid recipients bear the costs of education provides incentives for those best motivated and prepared to succeed in higher education to attend school. 
Conclusion
            The proposed method of eliminating government grants to college students in favor of loans to only means tested individuals would work to correct the distortions caused by a high level of government spending in the education market.  Additionally, decreasing government subsidy in this market would work to lower the sticker price of education, increase the value of education, and increase the quality of academic institutions.             




References
1. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2014). College Enrollment and he Work Activity of 2013 High School Graduates. Retrieved at bls.gov/news.release/hsgec.nr0.htm
2. U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics. (2013). Digest of Education Statistics, 2012 (NCES 2014-015), Chapter 3.
3. U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics. (2013). The Condition of Education 2013 (NCES 2013–037)
4. Skalli, A. (2007). "Are successive investments in education equally worthwhile? Endogenous schooling decisions and non-linearities in the earnings–schooling relationship." Economics Of Education Review, 26(2), 215-231.
5. U.S. Department of Education, Federal Student Aid, Title IV Program Volume Reports, Direct Loan Program, Federal Family Education Loan Program, Grant Programs. Retrieved from studentaid.ed.gov/about/data-center/student/title-iv.
6. Vedder, Richard. Going Broke by Degree: Why College Costs Too Much. Washington:
American Enterprise Institute, 2004.
7. Cato Institute, Cato Handbook for Policymakers, 7th Edition
8. National Assessment of Adult Literacy, “A First Look at the Literacy of American Adults in the 21st Century,” 2006, p. 15.

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